We develop a decision framework with imperfect information to analyze the effects of transaction costs on the tendency for individuals to remain with a default option.
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An individual must select either a default option, d, or one of (n − 1) alternatives, where n is an integer greater than one. The benefit of any option j = {d, 1, . . . , n − 1} derives from a 'match value', ε j , which is drawn independently from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. This avoids any systematic preference-based sources of default effects. As consistent with the case where the default is common or where information about the default is readily available, we assume that the individual is sufficiently familiar with the default that she knows its match value, ε d . However, to introduce imperfect information, we allow the individual to be initially uninformed about the alternatives.
If the individual takes no action, she automatically receives the default. If she wishes to select some alternative, j = d, she must first incur an information cost, c > 0, to identify the alternative and learn its match value, ε j . The individual can investigate any number of alternatives sequentially, incurring c each time. After each investigation, she can choose to either remain with the default at no extra cost or switch to an identified alternative for an additional switching cost, s > 0.
3
The model is deliberately simple, but our main results can hold under more general assumptions. For instance, if it was unnecessary to incur c to identify an alternative so that the individual could change to an alternative without knowing its match value, then it would still be optimal to make a prior investigation provided c was sufficiently small. 4 
Analysis
Let x be the value of x that solves c = 1 x (ε − x)dε, such that
Lemma 1. The individual's optimal decision rule is then:
Step 1: Accept the default immediately if ε d ≥ x − s. Otherwise move to Step 2.
Step 2: Investigate alternatives until the discovery of some ε j ≥ x for j = d, or until no alternative remains.
Step 3: Select the best option from the default and the set of identified alternatives, I,
This follows straightforwardly from Lemma 1 of Wilson (2012). In Step 1, the individual decides whether to start investigating the alternatives. Using standard induction arguments, this reduces to a seemingly-myopic comparison between the benefits of accepting the default immediately, ε d , and the expected net gains from investigating one alternative. To calculate the latter, note that the individual would only prefer the alternative to the default if its match value, ε, was greater than ε d + s. Thus, the expected net gains are
Equating this to ε d and letting ε d + s ≡ x implies that the individual is indifferent when
This provides the implicit definition for x used in (1). Consequently, she
In Step 2, the individual decides whether to continue investigating alternatives after having made one (or more) previous investigation(s). Using similar logic, this reduces to a comparison between the benefits from stopping immediately and the expected net benefits from investigating one further alternative. It follows that the individual will optimally stop only on the discovery of an alternative with a sufficiently large match value, ε ≥ x. By construction, the benefits from this alternative, ε − s, will necessarily exceed the benefits of the default, ε d . In Step 3, the individual then selects her best available option.
Measures of Default Effects
One common measure of default effects is the probability that the default is selected, P r(d).
Here,
The first term is the probability that the individual accepts the default immediately without any investigations, P r(ε d ≥ x − s). The second term is the probability that the individual selects the default after having made at least one investigation. From Lemma 1, 4 this only occurs if she investigates all (n − 1) alternatives yet still prefers the default. This
Step 3. As i) and iii) are sufficient to ensure that ii) is satisfied, Step 2 plays no direct role in determining P r(d). Finally, if x − s ≤ 0, then the individual never investigates, so
After simplifying (3),
However, as a measure, P r(d) does not incorporate the fact that the default could be optimal even if c and s were zero, because it could offer the highest match value, ε d > ε j ∀j = d. This occurs with probability,
Consequently, by building on the seminal paper by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) , who account for this issue empirically by comparing the number of subjects who selected an exogenous default with the number who selected the same option when it was not framed as a default, we consider two other measures. The 'absolute default effect', D A , is the difference in probability between selecting the default and the default offering the highest match value; and the 'relative default effect', D R , is this difference as a proportion.
From (5) and (6),
As an example, suppose n = 10 such that P r(d|c = s = 0) = 0. 
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This section analyzes how the three measures vary first with respect to c and s, and then n.
We assume x − s > 0 so that P r(d) < 1. When P r(d) = 1, the measures are independent of c and s, and our results with regard to n remain qualitatively robust. Proof: From (7), we need only prove that ∂P r(d)/∂z > 0 for z = c, s. From (4),
Transaction Costs
and ∂P r(d)/∂s = 1 − s n−1 . These are positive given n ≥ 2 and 0 < s < x < 1.
An increase in c raises the three measures by lowering the incentives to begin an investigation in Step 1. An increase in s produces a related effect but it also reduces the attractiveness of switching to an identified alternative in Step 3. However, information costs are a relatively more powerful determinant of default effects in the following sense. Proof: From (7), we need only prove that (
This follows given n ≥ 2 and 0 < s < x < 1.
The difference can be substantial; under our example parameters from Section 4, ∂P r(d)/∂c is over five times larger than ∂P r(d)/∂s. This suggests that the omission of information costs from arguments and models within the existing literature is indeed significant and that transaction costs may be more important than commonly thought. Intuitively, the result is not due to the fact that information costs can be incurred multiple times because it still holds when there is only one alternative. Instead, relative to a unit increase in s, a unit increase in c generates a sufficiently greater effect in reducing the expected net gains from making a first investigation. This follows from (2) , where the individual expects to incur c with certainty but expects to incur s only if the identified alternative is preferred to the default, which occurs with a probability less than one. Proof: Given n ≥ 2 and 0 < s < x < 1: i) ∆P r(d) ≡ P r(d|n+1)−P r(d|n) = − x−s 0 (ε+ Intuitively, an increase in n leaves the decision to start investigating in Step 1 unchanged, yet increases the probability of finding a preferred alternative in
Step 2, such that P r(d)
falls. However, as well as reducing P r(d), an increase in n also lowers the probability that the default offers the highest match value, P r(d|c = s = 0) = (1/n). Given D A = P r(d) − P r(d|c = s = 0) and D R = (P r(d)/P r(d|c = s = 0)) − 1, the reduction in P r(d|c = s = 0) is always sufficiently large relative to the reduction in P r(d) such that both D A and D R increase.
Discussion
Transaction costs may be a more important source of default effects than commonly thought.
However, as transaction costs cannot explain all of the evidence, future research might further consider the interaction between both direct and indirect transaction costs and other explanations. In particular, our search-theoretic framework could offer additional insights when combined with a behavioral model of procrastination, such as Choi et al (2003) or Carroll et al (2009) . In contrast to current models that assume full information, this would allow an analysis of the interaction between transaction costs and procrastination under imperfect information, and offer the potential for more general policy advice.
